A PILOT'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE

AUSTRALIAN PILOTS' DISPUTE OF 1989

APPENDICES

Author: Alex PATERSON

http://alexpaterson.net/aviation/pd89_appendices.htm

Last updated 11 March 2008

MASTER INDEX of articles written, placed online, or recommended by Alex Paterson

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 APPENDICES

 

APPENDIX 1.

MINUTES OF THE 15th AUG 1989 TACTICS MEETING.

MEETING: Hawke's Office 15th August 1989

NOTES OF: Dr. David HARRISON.

ATTENDING MEETING: Prime Minister, Abeles, Harris, Morris, Willis. Kelty by phone.

P.M./KELTY: Phone conversation:

Do a brief general note, discussed tactics how to handle airline pilots dispute.

Dr D.S. HARRISON

feb13.gd.1 113

________________________

113. Dr Harrison was a public servant in the Department of Prime Minister in Cabinet in 1989. Dr Harrison was asked to take notes at the 15 August 1989 meeting and was subpoenaed by the Pilots' Federation in 1992 to give evidence about the meeting in the Pilots' Federation's Federal Court Immigration Court case (No VG85 of 1990) pertaining to the Federal Government's action of changing the Immigration Regulations to facilitate the immigration of foreign pilots to replace Australian pilots. Dr Harrison gave oral evidence about the meeting in court on 21 February 1992 (see Court Transcript pages 212 - 235)

COMMENT by Alex Paterson

This meeting occurred in Prime Minister Bob Hawke's office on 15 August 1989, three days prior to the commencement of the Pilots' Federation's industrial campaign. The meeting was originally denied to have taken place, then that no minutes existed. The minutes of the meeting were taken down by Federal Government Public Servant, Dr D. S. Harrison, and were tendered as evidence in the Pilots' Federations' Immigration court action in the Federal Court. (VG 85 of 1991) The minutes provide insight into the members of this alliance's firm determination not to attempt to resolve the impending dispute by negotiation, but instead to focus all efforts on the destruction the Pilots' Federation. To this end, those attending the meeting planned:

Sir Peter Abeles also noted:

These minutes indicate grounds for criminal conspiracy based on the evidence:

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APPENDIX 2.

 

ANSETT AIRLINES' 'NOTICE TO PILOTS'.

Ansett Transport Industries Limited. Our Ref. 1806

From: DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER Date 27/8/1991

To: ALL FLIGHT CREW - ANSETT AUSTRALIA

ANSETT EXPRESS, ANSETT WA

Subject: RESPECT FOR COLLEAGUES AT WORK

It has been brought to my attention that, from time to time,
conversations and/or comments of a personal nature occur that
lead to ill will and resentment between staff.

Whilst it is not possible to eliminate misunderstandings
between people who work closely together in the work place, it
is essential everybody exhibits the utmost regard for the
feelings of their workmates.

In particular it is not acceptable in the work place to make
derogatory or offensive remarks or suggestions about a fellow
staff member or their private life.

I appreciate that it is only in rare circumstances that
comments of a derogatory or offensive nature are intentionally
made to others, however, all staff must take particular care to
ensure that what is said to others cannot be misunderstood to
be offensive.

I also draw to your attention that it is unlawful to
discriminate against another person on the basis of race,
colour, national origin, sex, marital status, pregnancy,
religion, political convictions or impairment and that such
will not be tolerated within Ansett.

I am sure that you will all co-operate to maintain a respectful
harmonious and happy workplace at Ansett.

Yours sincerely,

CAPTAIN M. TERRELL

DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER

cc. General Manger - Ansett WA
General Manager - Ansett Express 

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APPENDIX 3.

 

HAMILTON ISLAND INCIDENT.

The following internal East West Airlines report was anonymously sent to the Pilots' Federation and the incident was reported on ABC Radio News on 6/6/91. This incident is alleged to have occurred in late 1990. It is an example of the level of complacency towards airline safety which has emerged since the Pilots' Dispute within sections the Federal Government, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) and the Airlines. (in this case East West.) 114

The pertinent points regarding this affair are:

This system worked very well because it ensured that :

Having discovered any deficiencies which may have contributed to the incident, there was a serious attempt to rectify the situation to prevent a repeat episode.

EAST WEST PILOT BULLETIN

FLIGHT SAFETY BULLETIN

HAMILTON ISLAND OPERATIONS

During the recent less than perfect weather associated with the North Queensland wet season, one of our BAE 146 aircraft was involved in an incident during an approach to Hamilton Island which caused activation of the GPWS whilst attempting a go-round from the 32 VOR/DME approach.

This approach was being used as a cloud break procedure for a landing on RWY 14 and throughout the descent the understanding of the conditions at Hamilton Island justified this decision with passing showers and quite a strong wind from the east.

On descent it was also noted that a tailwind component of approx 50 kts existed which put the aircraft high on profile during the final stages of descent and on reaching the missed approach point was still higher than the chart profile and in less than ideal conditions.

The decision to abort this approach was not made until over the airport at which stage windshear was encountered with subsequent fluctuations in airspeed and no gain in altitude even though go-around power was being produced and a body angle of 25 deg NOSE UP being achieved. The GPWS system then started giving hard terrain warnings ceasing when North of the island.

Due to terrain problems associated with operations into Hamilton Island it is essential as can deduced from this incident that in conditions less than the required criteria the X.A.P. be strictly observed and carried out in accordance with I.A.L. procedures. I would also suggest as a refresher to these pilots who have not operated into Hamilton Island on a regular basis and indeed any port which has special conditions and procedures to take advantage of the Audio Visual displays at Hangar 10.

COMMENT by Alex Paterson:

Considering the fact that the aircraft involved in this incident appears to have come close to colliding with the high terrain at Hamilton Island, the cursory and totally inadequate manner in which this incident was investigated raises far more questions than it answers.

Close examination of this 'official' response to this incident reveals:

1. The document is not signed or dated and the author is not identified.

2. That according to the author "...the less than perfect weather associated with the North Queensland wet season..." is by implication somehow of relevance to this incident. This statement ignores the fact that the weather associated with a North Queensland wet season is not abnormal weather as far as a professional pilot is concerned. Difficult weather is not a mitigating circumstance for poor operating technique. It is the job of a professional pilot to operate within the constraints of the circumstances prevailing at that time.

3. "On descent it was also noted that a tailwind component of approx 50 kts existed which put the aircraft high on profile during the final stages of descent...."

The tailwind did not "put the aircraft high on approach." It was the aircrew's failure to take the tailwind into account which allowed the aircraft to get high on approach. It would appear that this aircrew had simply mismanaged the approach from the beginning.

4. "....on reaching the missed approach point, was still higher than the chart profile and in less than ideal conditions...... .....The decision to abort this approach was not made until over the airport." What this implies is that, without proper visual contact with the ground, the aircrew pressed on past the missed approach point. In other words it appears they broke the rules and 'pushed it' hoping to get visual contact with the airfield. Then...

5. "windshear was encountered with subsequent fluctuations in airspeed and no gain in altitude even though go-around power was being produced and a body angle of 25 deg NOSE UP being achieved. The GPWS system then started giving hard terrain warnings ceasing when North of the island."

It would appear that because the aircraft was lower than it should have been and hence near terrain, windshear was encountered whilst still in poor visibility. Then the 'ground proximity warning system' (GPWS) started giving 'hard' terrain warnings. It should be understood that a GPWS warning sounding when an aircrew have visual contact with the terrain is not dangerous and the warning can be safely ignored. However, according to this bulletin, the aircrew applied "go-around power". This implies that the aircraft may have been in imminent danger of colliding with high terrain whilst still not visual. If this was the case, the only appropriate course of action at this late stage would have been to select 'maximum power'. "Go around power" is not 'maximum power'. It is not credible that even pilots who appear to have made as many fundamental mistakes as this aircrew have, failed to select maximum power.

5. If maximum power had been selected (as it should have been), then the engines may have been 'over stressed'. That being the case, the engines should have been examined for damage, prior to the next take off. In other words, the only responsible course of action would have been to check the engines on the ground at Hamilton Island. (It is not known whether the engines were subsequently checked for damage.)

6. The author then states "Due to terrain problems associated with operations into Hamilton Island it is essential as can deduced from this incident that in conditions less than the required criteria the X.A.P. (missed approach point) be strictly observed and carried out in accordance with I.A.L. (instrument approach and landing) procedures."

There are no terrain problems as such at Hamilton Island. It is just another airfield with hills around it like many other airfields. The author implies in this document that only at Hamilton Island does the missed approach point need to be observed. The fact is, 'missed approach points' are where they are for very good reasons and as such must be observed always.

7. And finally, ".. I would also suggest as a refresher to these pilots who have not operated into Hamilton Island on a regular basis and indeed any port which has special conditions and procedures to take advantage of the Audio Visual displays at Hangar 10." It would appear that through cockpit mismanagement, the pilots involved in this incident may have come dangerously close to destroying an aircraft and obviously killing all on board.

Pre-dispute, these pilots would almost certainly have been grounded, subjected to a rigorous retraining program and then rechecked. It is doubtful that the Captain involved would have retained his command.

And the remedy post-dispute?

A 'slide' show in Hangar 10!

________________________

114. East West Airlines was a subsidiary of Ansett Airlines at the time of this alleged incident.

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APPENDIX 4

 

BUREAU OF SAFETY INVESTIGATION (BASI) REPORT

ANSETT BOEING 747-312 VH-INH SYDNEY AIRPORT 19 OCTOBER 1994

Following is the Synopsis and Conclusion of the BASI report into the Ansett B 747 landing incident at Sydney on 19/10/94 in which the aircrew inadvertently landed the aircraft with the nosewheel still retracted. The BASI investigation revealed numerous systemic deficiencies existing at the time within Ansett Airlines and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) which contributed significantly to the incident. The BASI report reveals that many of these deficiencies were a direct result of a poor corporate attitude existing within Ansett at the time resulting in commercial imperatives over-riding airline safety considerations. It is the assertion of the author that this sort of inappropriate corporate climate was a direct result of the aftermath of the Pilots' Dispute and could not have existed prior to the Dispute because it would have not been tolerated by most of the pilots employed at that time or the Pilots' Federation. Pre-dispute, Ansett management would have never dared attempt to introduce a new aircraft into the fleet in such a cavalier manner as revealed by the BASI investigation. 115

It should be noted that

NOTE: The complete BASI Report into this incident can be downloaded from the 'Internet' at: http://www.dot.gov.au/programs/basi/pdf/inhsynop.htm

_______________________

115. The Pilots' Federation's claims at the time of the Dispute that airline safety would be severely compromised by the introduction of individual contracts was generally dismissed by many commentators as nothing more than a scare tactic by the Federation. This incident and others since 1989 have vindicated the Federation's warnings.

SYNOPSIS

The flight was an international regular public transport operation between Sydney, Australia and Osaka, Japan on 19 October 1994. The technical crew consisted of a very experienced (B747) pilot in command who was also acting as a training pilot, an experienced co-pilot who had not yet completed his line training on the B747, and an experienced but newly B747-rated flight engineer who was on his first revenue flight as a qualified B747 flight engineer.

Approximately one hour after departure the crew shut down the number one engine because of an oil leak. They returned the aircraft to Sydney where the approach proceeded normally until the landing gear was selected. With selection of the landing gear and selection of the flap beyond a setting of flaps 20, the landing gear warning horn began to sound because the nose landing gear had not extended. The flight crew unsuccessfully attempted to establish the reason for the warning. Believing the gear to be down, the crew elected to complete the landing, with the result that the aircraft was landed with the nose gear retracted. There was no fire and the pilot in command decided not to initiate an emergency evacuation.

The investigation found that the oil loss was caused by the failure of a threaded insert used to retain the engine angle gearbox housing cover. The cover came loose, allowing oil to escape. An opportunity to action service bulletin SB JT9D-7R4-72-410, which would have prevented the oil leak had not been taken. Although the same engine is used on a number of aircraft approved for extended range operations over water, the manufacturer had not made the incorporation of this service bulletin mandatory. The owners of an aircraft can elect not to action a manufacturer's recommendation to incorporate a service bulletin.

An unexplained reduction in air-driven hydraulic pump output caused slower than expected operation of the number one hydraulic system. The system may still have been capable of extending all the landing gear, given adequate time. However, the aircraft landed before the system could complete the landing gear extension.

The flight crew had the opportunity to recognise and correct the landing gear problem prior to landing. The pilot in command attempted to determine the actual landing gear situation from the flight engineer. Although the flight engineer's panel indicated the nose gear was not down and locked, the flight engineer did not recognise this and subsequent communication and co-ordination between the flight crew failed to detect this error.

During the latter part of the flight, the crew did not adequately manage the operation of the aircraft. The crew's performance reflected a lack of effective crew resource management, the crew's lack of knowledge about some of the company's procedures for B747 operations, the flight engineer's and the co-pilot's lack of experience in the B747 and perceived pressure.

A review of events associated with the introduction of the B747 indicated that organisational factors involving both Ansett and the Civil Aviation Authority led to a situation where there was increased potential for an accident of this nature to occur. These factors included deficiencies in the planning and implementation of the introduction program for the new aircraft, particularly with respect to manuals, procedures and line training. In addition, all regulatory requirements were not observed, nor were they enforced.

The flight crew's performance combined with the organisational factors to breach defences that had been put in place to ensure the safety of regular public transport operations in high capacity aircraft. A number of recommendations were made as a result of the investigation.

Ansett Australia has advised the Bureau that it has taken a number of significant actions in response to this occurrence. Details of the actions taken can be found in Section 4 of this report.

BUREAU OF AIR SAFETY INVESTIGATION (BASI) REPORT

ANSETT BOEING 747-312 VH-INH SYDNEY AIRPORT 19 OCTOBER 1994

3.0 CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings

General

1. The crew was correctly licensed and qualified to operate the service as a regular public transport flight.

2. The flight was being used as a training flight for the co-pilot.

3. The flight was the first non-supervised line flight for the flight engineer.

4. There was a large difference in the level of experience on type between the pilot in command and both the other crew members.

Aircraft

5. The aircraft was serviceable prior to its departure from Sydney.

6. The number one engine was shut down due to loss of oil from a leaking angle gearbox housing cover.

7. The housing cover was leaking oil because an angle gearbox casing internal thread, which retained a threaded insert securing one of the cover attachment bolts, had stripped, allowing the cover to move and oil to escape.

8. It was possible to install the inserts in such a way that preload was insufficient, thus allowing the insert to vibrate until the threads failed.

9. Although the engine manufacturer had issued two service bulletins to correct the problem, neither addressed the root cause; nor was there any urgency specified for their incorporation.

10. The recorded performance of the number one hydraulic system during the accident flight was consistent with the demonstrated performance of the system when the number one engine was shut down and the air-driven pump was not delivering output.

11. The reason for an apparent reduction in output from the air-driven hydraulic pump system was not determined.

12. The only component in the nose landing gear system which exhibited test performance outside manufacturer's specifications was the nose landing gear door actuator. This component may have needed pressure and flow higher than specification levels to release the internal lock.

13. The flaps were moving almost continuously from the time of gear selection to touchdown. This, combined with the reduced output from the air-driven hydraulic pump, did not allow full system pressure and flow to be applied to the nose landing gear internal lock.

14. The landing gear warning and indicating system operated correctly.

Flight deck

15. The flight engineer did not recognise that the information presented on the landing gear annunciator panel indicated that the nose landing gear was not extended.

16. The design of the landing gear annunciator section of the flight engineers' panel did not facilitate quick recognition of the landing gear status when the nosewheel was not extended with the main gear.

17. Neither pilot recognised the significance of the words 'four greens' when spoken by the flight engineer in response to the pilot in command's query on the landing gear status.

18. The non-use of intercom and the ambient cockpit noise, combined with the lack of concern in the flight engineer's voice, probably contributed to both pilots not recognising the significance of the content of the flight engineer's comments regarding the number of green lights.

19. After the initial exchange on the gear status, the pilot in command appeared to have concluded that the gear was extended. Subsequent actions by the crew failed to resolve the ambiguity between the pilots' perception of the gear status and the continuing warnings.

20. The failure to resolve this ambiguity was partly a consequence of the pilot in command not using good crew resource management procedures, particularly with regard to initiating the 'red gear light remains illuminated' operations manual procedure without reference to the other crew members.

21. A go-around was not initiated despite the continuing landing gear warnings, the landing checklist challenge and responses being incomplete, the inner trailing edge flaps remaining in transit and the speed being 26 knots above target speed.

22. Subtle pressure resulting from the turn-around request and the invitingly close runway probably played a significant part in the crew's performance and decision making.

Organisational

23. Commercial imperatives resulted in the accelerated introduction of the B747 to the operator's fleet which, in turn, contributed to deficiencies in the management of manuals, procedures and line training.

24. Some of the flight operations department's development team, responsible for the management of the B747's introduction, were diverted onto a crew-training course at a critical stage of the introduction program.

25. The development team leader used management processes which did not highlight critical deficiencies during project planning or implementation.

26. The development team leader did not recognise the need to delay the start of B747 operations when it became apparent that some requirements would not be met.

27. B747-experienced staff within Ansett were not used to assist with planning or implementation of the B747 introduction.

28. The method of selecting flight engineers for training was driven principally by seniority rather than by a broader range of selection criteria, such as previous experience and adaptability.

29. Ground training of Ansett flight crew was completed in accordance with a Civil Aviation Authority approved syllabus.

30. Critical instructions and procedures had not been developed or put in place before the B747 training commenced. Procedures evolved rapidly and constantly as training progressed, causing confusion amongst trainees.

31. The training ability of contract flight engineers was not assessed prior to appointment or rostering in a training role.

32. The indoctrination of contract crews to Ansett's operating philosophies and procedures was inadequate.

33. Ansett crew resource management training was briefer than internationally accepted best practice.

34. Ansett's crew resource management training program was not fully effective in instilling crew resource management principles into the operational culture of the company's flight crews.

35. The Ansett operations culture tended to treat the B767 flight engineer as a 'systems specialist' rather than as a crew member integrated into all aspects of the flight deck operation. This background made it more difficult for the flight engineer to transition to the integral role played by a flight engineer in a B747 cockpit crew.

36. The overall training program did not adequately prepare the flight engineer for B747 operations.

37. Training standards, syllabuses and procedures for line training were either absent or deficient.

38. The Ansett training system did not incorporate a comprehensive reporting process.

39. Line checks were programmed to occur when minimum hours/sector requirements would be achieved but were not varied on trainee performance as reported in training reports.

40. Inadequate follow-up action was taken when the accident flight engineer failed his first formal check to the line. Discussions were not held with previous trainers, a remedial program was not developed and only two extra training sectors were allocated to correct the identified problems.

41. The manuals available to the crew did not include a definition of a 'stabilised approach' in a B747, nor was such a definition covered during training.

42. Management's option to use the same crew to complete the flight in another aircraft could not have been utilised without industrial and regulatory waivers, as it would have resulted in the flight crew exceeding their flight duty and flight-deck duty time limits.

43. Management and supervision of the Civil Aviation Authority's role in Ansett's B747 introduction was inadequate, partly because of a lack of training and partly because of a lack of resources. In addition, the Authority's management did not follow some aspects of its documented administrative instructions.

44. The Civil Aviation Authority's project manager issued an air operators certificate to Ansett before all the regulated requirements were met and without Ansett having developed and/or put in place all the necessary procedures.

45. Training for Civil Aviation Authority staff in the procedures for issuing an air operators certificate was inadequate.

46. The organisational climate prevailing in the Civil Aviation Authority at the time was biased towards commercial considerations rather than ensuring regulatory compliance and safety.

47. Real or imagined pressure, caused by a seemingly inflexible starting date for Ansett's B747 operations, probably influenced some of the actions taken by Civil Aviation Authority staff.

48. Civil Aviation Authority staff did not take sufficient action to ensure that concerns raised during inspections and surveillance were addressed.

3.2 Significant factors

1. Adequate steps had not been taken by the engine manufacturer to correct a known deficiency with the angle gearbox inserts. This led to the number one engine being shut down due to a loss of oil.

2. During the accident approach, reduced output from the air-driven hydraulic pump system severely degraded the capability of the number one hydraulic system to extend the nose landing gear in the time remaining between landing gear selection and the aircraft's touchdown.

3. The flight engineer did not perceive that one of the five gear annunciator lights on his panel was not illuminated when he was asked to check their status.

4. The pilot in command interpreted the information initially supplied by the flight engineer as indicating that the gear was extended. From this point the pilot in command maintained a mindset which influenced his further decisions and actions.

5. The co-pilot heard the conversation concerning the analysis of the landing gear between the pilot in command and the flight engineer, and formed the same conclusions as the pilot in command with regard to the status of the gear.

6. The crew's erroneous perception of the gear status was not corrected by subsequent communications nor by the effective use of crew resource management principles and practices.

7. A go-around was not initiated despite the continuation of warning indications, the approach not being stable and apparent unresolved ambiguity of the situation.

8. Significant local factors influencing crew performance were:

9. Significant organisational factors contributing to the accident were: Commercial imperatives to arrive at Kansai Airport at its opening resulted in an accelerated introduction of the B747 aircraft into Ansett's operations.

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APPENDIX 5.

 

AUST./U.S. COMPARISON OF PILOT PAY RATES

SOURCE: AFAP 18th August 1988, All rates $AUST.. Per Annum., Senior Captain.

A300

Australian Airlines

$102278


U.S. Air

$183645


Eastern

$133192


Pan American

$179934


Continental

$ 99114


A300 US Average

$148971




B767

Ansett Airlines

$102531


U.S. Air

$184155


American

$184178


Delta

$203167


Piedmont

$187830


Transworld

$128400


United

$179885


B767 US Average

$177936




B727-200

Australian Airlines

$ 87241


Delta

$184569


Eastern

$115539


Fying Tiger

$ 92422


Northwest

$177174


Pan Am

$150880


Piedmont

$181785


Republic

$144489


United

$163247


Continental

$ 99114


TWA

$113578


B727 US Average

$131880




B727-100

Australian Airlines

$ 92073


American

$164662




B737-300

Australian Airlines

$ 85467


US Air

$173145


American

$156570


Piedmont

$174405


B737 US Average

$168040




DC9

Australian Airlines

$ 81542


Delta

$172941


Eastern

$113399


Republic

$144489


Hawiian

$118260


Pacific Southwest

$142385


Continental

$ 80051


DC9 US Average

$128586




F-28

Ansett Airlines

$ 79573


Piedmont

$112860




BAe 146

Ansett Airlines

$ 74681


Pacific Southwest

$123752

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APPENDIX 6.

 

EXAMPLES OF PRE-DISPUTE PILOT ROSTERS

COMMENT by Alex Paterson:

The following two examples of pre-dispute rosters (blocks) are provided to explain the method by which pilots' pay used to be calculated pre-dispute. This result is then compared with the pay for exactly the same roster after it has been calculated using the post-dispute 'Individual Contract' method.

The average pay increase for a typical pre-dispute pilot roster using the pay calculation rules of the new 'Individual Contracts' is over 25%.

By completely changing the method used to calculate pilots' pay, Sir Peter Abeles and his partners were able to create a 'smoke screen' around the issue of pilot's pay. In this way they were able to convince the public (who were significantly funding their side of the Dispute) into believing that a 25% pilot pay rise (which they had to pay to get pilots) was only 6%!

It should be remembered that the justification for the raft of tactics used against the Pilots, which included a government grant of at least $100 million of tax payers' money, plus the apparent inability to resolve the Dispute, was because the Pilots' original pay claim (to be negotiated) was alleged to be outside the wage fixing guidelines of that time by being in excess of 6%. Hence the reason for keeping the pay rise secret. The presence of this hidden pay rise provides clear evidence that the Dispute was never really about pilots' pay, but rather the subjugation of Pilots for the various reasons discussed elsewhere.

NOTE 1: Block 5 Dec 1988 is a low hour roster, whereas Block 7 Feb 1989 is a high hour roster.

NOTE 2:. The OVERTIME DAY ('O day') ANOMALY.

The original concept of 'O days' was supposed to be an 8% pay rise outside the wage fixing guidelines associated with the 'Accord' of that time. Pilots nominated a day where they made themselves 'more available' for overtime flying. For this 'extra availability' pilots were paid 6 hours pay whether they flew or not. Because this exercise was designed to be a pay rise circumventing the wage fixing guidelines of that time, 'O day' pilots were originally placed at the bottom of the availability list for any extra flying. However, the IRC subsequently insisted that the 'O day' pilots went to the top of the availability list. As a consequence of this change, pilots usually ended up working on their 'O day'. The net effect of this change degraded the monetary value of the 'O day' concept from the planned 8% to about 4% because:-

The pay scale in the new individual contracts fully compensated 8% for the loss of the 'O day' allowance despite the fact that the 'O day' was effectively only worth 4%.

This had the defacto effect of hiding an extra 4% pay rise in the Individual Contracts, hence the 'O day anomaly'.

Pre-Dispute Roster BLOCK 5 Dec 1988 MEL B-767

Note 1: All flight duty as a passenger marked with an asterix *

Note 2: All times Eastern Standard Time (E.S.T.)

Note 3: 'Grey' days were days that pilots could choose to 'bid' for overtime.

DAY

Flight

Number

Depart

Port

Depart

Time

Dest

Port

Dest

Time

Sector

Mins

Flight

Mins

Pay

Mins

TOTAL

Time Away

THU 01

Grey









FRI 02

Grey



















SAT 03

22

MEL

1400

SYD

1510

70

70

240












SUN 04

8

SYD

0930

BNE

1045

75





21

BNE

1200

SYD

1320

80





20

SYD

1415

BNE

1530

75

230

240












MON 05

25

BNE

1400

SYD

1520

80





25

SYD

1600

MEL

1715

75





30

MEL

1800

SYD

1910

70





* 37

SYD

2015

MEL

2130

75

225

300










851

3405

TUE 06

Off









WED 07

Off









THU 08

'O' Day



















FRI 09

22

MEL

1400

SYD

1510

70





27

SYD

1700

MEL

1815

75





55

MEL

1900

PER

2245

225

370

370


SAT 10

Layover









SUN 11

245

PER

1405

SYD

1800

235





* 33

SYD

1830

MEL

1945

75

235

310










825

3300

MON 12

Off









SUN 13

Off



















WED 14

26

MEL

1600

SYD

1710

70





245

SYD

1825

BNE

1940

75





39

BNE

2015

SYD

2135

80





401

SYD

2230

MEL

2345

75

300

360










360

540











THU 15

* 55

MEL

1900

PER

2245

225

0

240


FRI 16

Layover









SAT 17

221

PER

0210

SYD

0605

235





* 1

SYD

0645

MEL

0800

75

235

310










566

2265











SUN 18

22

MEL

1400

SYD

1510

70





22

SYD

1550

BNE

1705

75





1133

BNE

1740

SYD

1900

80





39

SYD

2220

MEL

2335

75

300

325










325

650











MON 19

Grey









TUE 20

Off









WED 21

Off









THU 22

Grey



















FRI 23

* 1

MEL

0845

PER

1230

225





245

PER

1415

SYD

1810

235

235

460


SAT 24

92

SYD

0830

OOL

0940

70





1181

OOL

1020

MEL

1220

120





1082

MEL

1300

OOL

1450

110





1083

OOL

1530

MEL

1730

120

420

420










880

2010











SUN 25

12

MEL

0900

SYD

1010

70





1112

SYD

1040

HTI

1250

120





1125

HTI

1330

SYD

1535

125

325

325


MON 26

1090

SYD

0735

OOL

0845

70





1090

OOL

0910

BNE

0935

25





* 17

BNE

0955

SYD

1115

80

95

240


TUE 27

1062

SYD

0740

BNE

0855

75





17

BNE

0955

SYD

1115

80





14

SYD

1205

BNE

1320

75





25

BNE

1400

SYD

1520

80





25

SYD

1600

MEL

1715

75

385

385










950

3450











WED 28

Off









THU 29

Off









FRI 30

Grey









SAT 31

Grey



















GRAND

TOTAL

MINS

FOR

THE

MONTH


3425

4757

15620

GRAND

TOTAL

HRS

FOR

THE

MONTH


57

79.3

260

TOTAL time actually flying an aircraft is 57 hours

TOTAL duty as a passenger, which is all flights marked * is 755 mins

TOTAL time away from home is 260 hrs for the month, which averages 59 hrs/wk

'OLD' PRE-DISPUTE CONTRACT PAY CALCULATION FORMULA:

For the purpose of pay calculation, each day at work was 'credited' with either the total flying hours for the day or at least four hours minimum, whichever was greater. This figure was called the pay 'credit hours' for the day. Duty as a passenger (paxing) was considered 100% 'flying' and paid as such.

Total 'pay credit minutes' of this roster is 4798 mins, which is 80 hours for the month. However, pilots were guaranteed to be paid a minimum of 85 hours per month. The pre-dispute contract pay rate was $86 per hour x 85 'credit hours' = $7310 for the month.

In addition, pilots were paid a standard $1455 per month called 'Base pay'.

Thus, the total pay for this month pre-dispute used to be $7310 + $1455 = $8765 116

'NEW' INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT PAY FORMULA:

Total time actually flying an aircraft. 57.0 Hrs Total time Paxing = 755 mins (12.6 Hrs), which earns 1/2 Flight pay. 6.3 Hrs pay

Total pay hours under new Individual Contract rules for pay calculation = 63.3 Hrs

Now, the first 55 Hrs is paid a 'standard' rate of pay for the month of $10,027 The next 8.3 Hrs is called 'overtime' and paid at the rate of $182 per hour = $ 1510

Thus, the total pay for this month post dispute became $11537 117

The difference between the 'old' pay and the 'new' pay is $11537 ¯ $8765 = $ 2772

This is a 32% pay increase.

However, the 'individual contracts' do not have all the 'allowances' that were in the 'old' contract which were worth about 10%. (i.e. No car allowance, no licence renewal allowance, no 'O day' allowance etc.)

Thus the effective real pay increase for this roster is 22%.

NOTE 1: This figure does not count real overtime.

NOTE 2: It was implied during the dispute that Pilots performed little work. However, it should be noted that this roster contains:

5 late night sign offs i.e. After 21.30

3 early morning sign ons i.e. Before 7 am.

9 nights away from home port.

No weekends off. (However, 1 Saturday off)

Total time away from home is 260 hrs for the month, which averages 59 hours per week.

________________________

116. Reference section 9 page 18 of Ansett Airline Pilots' Agreement 1988.

117. Reference section 8 page 6 of IRC Ansett Airlines Pilots' Award 1989.

Pre-Dispute Roster BLOCK 7 Feb 1989 MEL B-767

Note 1: All flight duty as a passenger marked with an asterix *

Note 2: All times Eastern Standard Time (E.S.T.)

Note 3: 'Grey' days were days that pilots could choose to 'bid' for overtime.

DAY

Flight

Number

Depart

Port

Depart

Time

Dest

Port

Dest

Time

Sector

Mins

Flight

Mins

Pay

Mins

TOTAL

Time Away

TUE 31

Grey









WED 01

Off









THU 02

Off



















FRI 03

6

MEL

0715

SYD

0825

70





6

SYD

0915

BNE

1030

75





6

BNE

1105

HTI

1230

85





27

HTI

1305

BNE

1425

80





27

BNE

1505

SYD

1625

80

390

390


SAT 04

7

SYD

0800

MEL

0915

75





14

MEL

1000

SYD

1110

70





14

SYD

1205

BNE

1320

75





25

BNE

1400

SYD

1520

80

300

300


SUN 05

7

SYD

0800

MEL

0915

75





14

MEL

1000

SYD

1110

70





14

SYD

1205

BNE

1320

75





25

BNE

1400

SYD

1520

80





25

SYD

1600

MEL

1715

75

375

375










1065

3555

MON 06

'O' Day



















TUES 07

8

MEL

0800

SYD

0910

70





11

SYD

1000

MEL

1115

75





20

MEL

1200

SYD

1310

70

215

240


WED 08

62

SYD

0740

BNE

0955

75





17

BNE

0955

SYD

1115

80





17

SYD

1200

MEL

1315

75

230

240









480

1830












THU 09

Off









FRI 10

Off









SAT 11

Off



















SUN 12

* 1

MEL

0845

PER

1230

225





245

PER

1405

SYD

1800

235

235

460


MON 13

7

SYD

0800

MEL

0915

75





14

MEL

1000

SYD

1110

70





14

SYD

1205

BNE

1320

75





25

BNE

1400

SYD

1520

80

300

300


TUE 14

62

SYD

0740

BNE

0855

75





17

BNE

0955

SYD

1115

80





17

SYD

1200

MEL

1315

75

230

240










1000

3195











WED 15

22

MEL

1400

SYD

1510

70





25

SYD

1600

MEL

1715

75





30

MEL

1800

SYD

1910

70





* 37

SYD

2015

MEL

2130

75

215

290










290

525











THU 16

30

MEL

1800

SYD

1910

70





34

SYD

2025

BNE

2140

75

145

240


FRI 17

* 25

BNE

1400

SYD

1520

80





27

SYD

1700

MEL

1815

75

75

240










480

1530

SAT 18

Off









SUN 19

Off



















MON 20

4

MEL

0700

SYD

0810

70





652

SYD

0855

BNE

1010

75





21

BNE

1200

SYD

1320

80

225

240


TUE 21

7

SYD

0800

MEL

0915

75





14

MEL

1000

SYD

1110

70





14

SYD

1205

BNE

1320

75





* 25

BNE

1400

SYD

1520

80

220

300


WED 22

62

SYD

0740

BNE

0855

75





17

BNE

0955

SYD

1115

80





17

SYD

1200

MEL

1315

75

230

240










832

3330

THU 23

Grey



















FRI 24

26

MEL

1600

SYD

1710

70





245

SYD

15

BNE

1940

75





39

BNE

2015

SYD

2135

80





* 39

SYD

2220

MEL

2335

75

225

300










300

530

SAT 25

Grey









SUN 26

Grey









MON 27

Off









TUE 28

Off



















WED 01

8

MEL

0800

SYD

0910

70





660

SYD

1005

BNE

1120

75





21

BNE

1200

SYD

1320

80





21

SYD

1350

MEL

1505

75

300

300










300

500











GRAND

TOTAL

MINS

FOR

THE

MONTH


3910

4747

14995

GRAND

TOTAL

HRS

FOR

THE

MONTH


65.15

79.1

250

TOTAL time actually flying an aircraft is 65.15 hours

TOTAL duty as a passenger, which is all flights marked * is 535 mins

TOTAL time away from home is 250 hrs for the month, which averages 57 hrs/wk

'OLD' PRE-DISPUTE CONTRACT PAY CALCULATION FORMULA:

For the purpose of pay calculation, each day at work was 'credited' with either the total flying hours for the day or at least four hours minimum, whichever was greater. This figure was called the pay 'credit hours' for the day. Duty as a passenger (paxing) was considered 100% 'flying' and paid as such.

Total 'pay credit minutes' of this roster is 4747 mins, which is 79.1 hours for the month. However, pilots were guaranteed to be paid a minimum of 85 hours per month. The pre-dispute contract pay rate was $86 per hour x 85 'credit hours' = $7310 for the month.

In addition, pilots were paid a standard $1455 per month called 'Base pay'.

Thus, the total pay for this month pre-dispute used to be $7310 + $1455 = $8765 118

'NEW' INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT PAY FORMULA:

Total time actually flying an aircraft. 65.15 Hrs

Total time Paxing = 535 mins (8.9 Hrs) , which earns 1/2 Flight pay. 4.45 Hrs pay

Total pay hours under new Individual Contract rules, for pay calculation = 69.60 Hrs

Now, the first 55 Hrs is paid a 'standard' rate of pay for the month of $10,027

The next 14.6 Hrs is called 'overtime' and paid at the rate of $182 per hour = $ 2657

Thus, the total pay for this month post dispute became $12,684 119

The difference between the 'old' pay and the 'new' pay is $12684 ¯ $8765 = $ 3919

This is a 44% pay increase.

However, the 'individual contracts' do not have all the 'allowances' that were in the 'old' contract which were worth about 10%. (i.e. No car allowance, no licence renewal allowance, no 'O day' allowance etc.)

Thus the effective real pay increase for this roster is 34%.

NOTE 1: This figure does not count real overtime.

NOTE 2: It was implied during the dispute that Pilots performed little work. However, it should be noted that this roster contains:

3 late night sign offs i.e. After 21.30

11 early morning sign ons i.e. 7 am or earlier.

8 nights away from home port.

Total time away from home is 250 hrs for the month, which averages 57 hours per week.

________________________

118. Reference section 9 page 18 of Ansett Airline Pilots' Agreement 1988.

119. Reference section 8 page 6 of IRC Ansett Airlines Pilots' Award 1989.

RETURN TO SITE INDEX

APPENDIX 7.

 

CAPT DICK HOLT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS

 

TO: All members of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots

FROM: Dick Holt

SUBJECT: The "Award" Applications by your Employers

Brian McCarthy has granted me the privilege of direct communication with you about the "awards" application if I wish. I do wish and I will try to contain my language.

This "award" has been carefully drawn up by and on behalf of persons having a massive dislike of pilots and which under normal standards would cause its originators to be dismissed for stupidity.

It is made possible only by a mischievous and dangerous association between parties and persons in political and commercial fields each of which has a direct vested interest in destroying the protection under which you have worked for several decades.

This is proven inter alia, by the fact that these awards would destroy by elimination, a host of protections which have nothing whatsoever to do with the Dispute at large.

It seems to me that such awards would leave you:

and so on.

The proposed Australian Section 6B says: "It is not considered necessary nor possible to specify every detail of the duties, it being generally understood within the aviation industry what those duties comprise" (I wonder who wrote that!) The proposed Ansett award at Section 21 says: "all other conditions of employment shall be as determined by the employer".

So - you are left with your employer making all of the decisions on all of the matters listed above as and when they come up, which they surely will, and a multitude of other matters including introduction of new aircraft types.

The style of management mischief and patronage this would recreate appals me.

Another vicious section of the general approach to the Industrial Relations Commission is the request by the airline management group to set aside all General Aviation Awards - an animal act taken without any thought of the consequences, other than an insane desire to get at pilots.

All in all, this is vintage 1950 - 1959 stuff. In those days:

I'm not being nostalgic - you may be assured that the 1990's version of that kind of treatment awaits you under such awards.

No other Association or Trade Union in Australia would accept such a disgusting recession to employer savagery and denigration of current working conditions.

Dick Holt. 4.10. 89 120

________________________

120. Captain Dick Holt was a former long serving President of the Pilots' Federation. Despite the fact that he had retired from Ansett Airlines over 10 years earlier, he was so concerned about the destruction being wrought on his former profession that he placed and paid for full page advertisements in the nation's metropolitan daily newspapers. (The Age, The Australian etc) He did this to explain to both the public and the members of Abeles' Coalition, the inevitable consequences of the dispute. Although not wealthy, he refused to accept money from pilots to pay for the said advertisements. (Estimated to have cost at least $100,000.)

RETURN TO SITE INDEX

APPENDIX 8

 

IRC DEPUTY PRESIDENT HANCOCK'S S118 DECISION

On 13th March, 1990 the Airline Companies made application to have the matter of award respondency considered by the Full Bench of the IRC with the intention of having AFAP removed as the respondent to the new Pilot Awards. Commission President Barry Maddern referred the matter to Deputy President Hancock for arbitration.

On 14th March, 1990 hearings regarding the award respondency commenced in front of Deputy President Hancock.

On 22nd of September 1994, after 70 sitting days, Commissioner Hancock handed down his decision regarding the Domestic Airline Pilot Award respondency (known by Pilots as the Section 118 case) In handing down his decision, Commissioner Hancock delivered a surprisingly candid appraisal of many aspects of the Pilots' Dispute.

Not surprisingly, Commissioner Hancock made no adverse comment on the IRC's handling of the Dispute. Commissioner Hancock had been one of the three Industrial Relations Commissioners on the full bench of the IRC presiding over the Dispute in 1989. Because of his position, Commissioner Hancock had been intimately involved in the IRC's handling of the Dispute since the beginning.

Commissioner Hancock's decision ran to 298 pages. The Pilots' Federation Executive Director, Mr Terry O'Connell, compiled the following selection from Mr Hancock's report for AFAP members' information and published it in the Federation's 'Go-Around' newsletter in January 1995.

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF AIR PILOTS

GO-AROUND January 1995

SECTION 118 DECISION

The long awaited decision over 70 sitting days by Senior Deputy President Hancock was handed down on the 22nd September 1994. It ran to 298 pages but is interim in that he has made no decision in relation to which organisation will represent the Ansett, East West and Ipec pilots.

To pick and choose paragraphs obviously raises the question of subjective/objective selection. As Executive Director I have attempted to choose paragraphs that deal with the major issues raised by pilots with me over the years since the dispute in 1989. Most of the excerpts are taken from conclusions of the various sections into which the decision is divided :

The AFAP Approach to the Dispute

Pre-Dispute "Overall the Federation's campaign in the pre- dispute period, carried strong membership support. In such a campaign, it is necessary that there be planning, leadership and - in all probability - a measure of secrecy. These were all aspects of the strategy. In recognising this of course, I am commending neither the AFAP's objectives nor its preparedness to resort to industrial action in pursuit of them".

Resignations

"I reject the contention that members of the AFAP participated in the resignation strategy because they were manipulated and deceived. My reasons, in summary, for reaching this conclusion are:

To these reasons I add the following. If the members signed the forms of resignation because they were taken by surprise and confused, it might be expected that there would be a reconsideration. No evidence exists that, in the first month or thereabouts after 24 August, there was any widespread disposition on the pilots' part to question the step which they had taken. The employers, by offering to re-engage them, provided opportunities for pilots to "reconsider" their resignations. Few availed themselves of those offers until much later in the dispute, when the failure of the strategy had become obvious.

That the resignations were catastrophic for the AFAP and many of its members is beyond dispute. They do not, however, stand apart from the chain of events which was inherent in the determination of the Federation - with overwhelming membership support - to free the pilots from the restraints of the then-existing wages system. Of course, there existed the alternative of "turning back". This would have been a massive retreat. There is no evidence that more than a handful of pilots wanted it. At the time of the resignations, the AFAP and the pilot body were not separate entities: the leaders and the members were as one".

"Turning to the latter version of the allegation that the resignations were an industrial tactic, I think that the implied dichotomy between industrial purposes is unrealistic. The AFAP, confronted with the employers' recourse to writs, could hardly have allowed its members' liabilities to escalate. Deferring action in respect of any pilot until that pilot was served with a writ would have been irresponsible, because the pilot's liability might have mounted in the meantime. In reality, the AFAP was obliged to choose between a resumption of normal flying in accordance with the pilots' contracts, on the one hand, and bringing the contracts to an end, on the other. The former course implied a renunciation of industrial action in pursuit of the wage claim. Hence the continued pursuit of the claim by industrial action and protection of the members' interests by resignation were, in practice, inseparable. It is unremarkable that the leaders, having secured the resignations, would hope to impress the employers as to the pilots' solidarity. To have forfeited that opportunity would have been inept".

Communication and Leadership

"Communication with members was central to the leaders' strategy. Three purposes have been identified:

Of course, it is attractive to different interests in these proceedings to emphasise a particular purpose and to disregard others. That approach, however, is a distortion. I am convinced that all three purposes existed. Indeed, the dispute could not have been sustained otherwise. The events of the dispute cannot be understood by "explanations" which disregard its complexity. It is important, however, to note that the periodic and well-attended meetings of pilots did afford opportunities for the strategy to be challenged. A degree of courage was required; but that is because the large majority of members was in accord with the strategy. The Federation certainly had leaders who led - as it happened, to disaster. As I have suggested, they were probably separated from the members to a degree late in 1989 by not disclosing fully their doubts about the outcome of the dispute. It is understandable that some of the "rank and file" members who became seized of similar doubts began to make their own decisions in their own interests. I cannot, however, accept the more extreme conceptions of "deception", "manipulation" and "intimidation" that were advanced in the proceedings. The members of the AFAP - both those who "stayed" and those who "left" - were responsible for their own choices".

The Federation and the Commission

"By late November, the leaders of the AFAP were torn between their reluctance to participate fully in "the system" and their perception - reinforced by external advice - that the Commission was the only means of protecting the pilots' employment prospects and preserving the Federation's industrial role. Their attempt to invoke the commission's "good offices", while avoiding the requirements of full participation in the system, failed when the Federation's applications were before Paine C. They then realised that compliance with the conditions of award respondence stated by the Full Bench on 6 October was but a matter of time. That it took many weeks, punctuated by the picketing episode in Western Australia, for them to act on this realisation, evinces the Federation's unease about confirming to the norms of the system.

The commitments and the answers to questions given in the March proceedings, in their terms, constitute a full acceptance of those norms. I accepted them - subject to the period of "probation" - in my decision. In this case, I have to consider whether the belatedness of AFAP's compliance and the circumstances in which it was forthcoming tell against its continued representation of pilots. They may, perhaps, do so because

The first of these considerations raises the issue of punishment, with which I deal more broadly in the last Part of this decision. I do not pursue it here. The second is important because it implies that the Federation, if given the chance, would revert to its earlier attitudes and might behave in a similar fashion. There can, of course, be no certainty about this. Nevertheless I do not think that my decision in this case should be strongly influenced by the risk of recidivism. My view arises not only from the undertakings given by the AFAP in March 1990 but also from the low likelihood of the recurrence of circumstances which would induce conduct such as occurred in the dispute; and I should be surprised if the Federation had learned nothing from the experience. As to the third consideration, I simply note that little evidence exists that pilots were estranged from the Federation because of its conduct in the Commission. Had this been a significant concern, the defections would have occurred much earlier".

The Resistance

"The AFAP's complaint, of course, is not merely with the unexpected charter of the resistance but also with its perceived unfairness. As I comprehend it, the argument is that the combination of the companies' refusal to deal with the AFAP and governmental intervention on the employers' side placed the AFAP in a position where it could not conclude a tolerable settlement; for the companies would not voluntarily countenance any settlement which accorded an enduring role of the AFAP. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I am satisfied that at some stage in August 1989 - I cannot be more precise - the companies decided that they would no longer treat the AFAP as the pilots' representative except to the minimum degree required by law. The reasons are unclear. They may relate to earlier experience, i.e. the AFAP's successes in deploying its industrial might; they may have reflected a perception that the decimation of the AFAP would allow them a freer hand in managing (including reducing) their pilot complements; and they may have reflected a sense of outrage at the damage which the AFAP was prepared to inflict on them in pursuit of its claim. Because of their failure to call relevant witnesses, the companies are not entitled to expect me to ignore any of these possibilities. The approach which they took to the AFAP's eventual application for respondency, the Section 118A applications and the companies' attitude to the AFAP during the period between the end of the dispute and the end of these proceedings may be seen as firm adherence to a policy on which they embarked in August 1989. This is a conclusion to be revisited in the final part of this decision. For the present, I record my broad acceptance of the AFAP's contention that the companies' stance militated against retreat by the AFAP. This, I hasten to add, does not condone the AFAP's conduct toward the Commission, which was full cognisant of the Federation's rights.

I should also emphasise that no blame attaches to the airlines for their attempts to persuade pilots to return to work in defiance of the AFAP for so long as the Federation resisted the authority of the commission. They had no obligation to concede the AFAP's wage claim. Indeed, they had a responsibility to resist it. They were entitled to seek to restore services. It was not their duty to protect the solidarity of the AFAP's membership. I am satisfied that the primary purpose of the companies in instituting legal action against the AFAP, its officers and officials, and pilots themselves was to deter the AFAP and its members from persisting in their industrial action. This accords with Mr Green's evidence and my understanding of the discussion of 15 August. It may be, however, that the companies' persistence in their damages claims was eventually linked with an objective of destroying the AFAP".

The Employed Pilots

"Given the support for the industrial campaign which pilots had overwhelmingly given, I find it entirely credible - to be expected, indeed - that those who "returned" would in many instances have experienced a sense of guilt about their defection, however it may have been sublimated. This judgement does not cause me to assume that the returned pilots' alienation from the AFAP will easily mellow. On the contrary, a sense of guilt is more likely than not to have accentuated the defectors' determination to distance themselves from their past associations".

Damages

I here refer to the contingent liability arising from the award of damages in the Victorian Supreme Court. Mr O'Connell gave his opinion that, by reason of a commitment given to the ACTU, the airlines would not enforce the damages. (The position with respect to costs was less definite). I accept the auditors' view about the consequences of enforcement. In my judgement, however, the possibility that the airlines might act to bring about those consequences ought not to affect my decision. They have made the applications which are before me and have not to date put the AFAP "out of business" by enforcing the Supreme Court's judgement. I presume that they seek a decision on merit. The only defensible approach open to me is to assume that my decision, one way or the other, is relevant, which implies that the debts will not be enforced. For this reason, I disregard them in considering the AFAP's viability. I imply no opinion as to whether the airlines will or should require payment".

Company Attitudes

With respect to the broader question - whether the companies' behaviour had "produced" much of the case against the AFAP - there can be no avoidance of the responsibility which the AFAP and its members bear as originators of the dispute, the prolongation of it and actions taken in the course of it. It is also true, however, that the doubts which now exist about the Federation's credibility as a union for pilots are due in part to the difficulties which it has encountered in trying to rehabilitate itself. Those difficulties are, in some degree, caused by the employers".

Aircraft Safety

"The evidence leads me to the conclusion that an indiscriminate mixing of pilots from the two groups created by the dispute might well have safety implications. It does not persuade me, however, that no pilot from one group could safely work with a pilot from the other. Appropriate selection is essential. The companies, I believe, are capable of selecting compatible pilots and, in fact, have done so. Since the "returned" pilots were already in place, the unemployed pilots after the dispute were confronted with three impediments to their recruitment :

Having regard to the priority of safety, I think that the companies were entitled to be cautious in selecting from the ranks of the unemployed pilots.

This case, however, is not about recruitment. A decision as to whether or not the AFAP should continue to represent the industrial interest of pilots is not a decision as to whether more or fewer of the unemployed pilots should be re-engaged. The evidence that membership of the AFAP ipso facto would cause safety problems is tenuous. Dr Zentner, for example, did not think it necessary to inquire whether prospective pilots belonged to the AFAP. He assumed that some did, but thought that other factors were "more material to making a decision as to risk than whether they actually retain membership of an organisation". No conceivable outcome of these proceedings will entail a re- absorption by the airlines of the large majority of the unemployed pilots. In my opinion, the question whether the AFAP should retain representation rights does not turn, to any significant degree, upon issues of safety".

On Discrimination

"The companies have re-employed some AFAP members since the dispute. Had they employed none, the inference of discrimination might have been compelling. Were the recruitments from AFAP ranks a token exercise? Since the companies produced no evidence of their recruitment policies and practices - as they might have done - I do not exclude that possibility. I am alive to the provisions of Section 334 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988, whereby various acts which would disadvantage persons for membership of a registered trade union are offences. There is no suggestion that airlines have been convicted of - or even prosecuted for - offences under that section. The ASU submits : "Had there in fact been any unlawful threat by the Companies to terminate or otherwise damage in employment any employed pilot on account of his membership of the AFAP, the commission would have very clear evidence about it". This submission assumes that the evidence of unlawful threats would necessarily have been available to the AFAP. That assumption is unwarranted. A pilot who was subjected to such a threat may have elected to comply with the employer's demand rather than report it to the AFAP. I do not assume, however, that the companies have acted unlawfully. Direct discrimination against the AFAP was not necessary to place its members at a disadvantage: reluctance to recruit from the ranks of the "unemployed" pilots, most of whom were AFAP members, would have a similar effect".

The Decision

I grant the application of Qantas and the amended application of Australian and refuse the application of ASU. In doing so, I rely upon AIPA's undertaking to provide appropriately for the separate interests of domestic pilots. To protect the rights of potential appellants, I shall in due course issue formal orders consistent with this decision wherein the operative date will be specified. The time at which the orders are issued may be affected by the conclusion in the main case".

"I turn to more general matters of union structure. The AFAP and AIPA both contend that pilots require specialised representation. This is a claim for craft unionism and, as such, requires some justification in view of the policy of the Act, which favours industry-based unions. That pilots are a distinctive group is clear. Their work is highly-specialised, requires intense training and carries unusual responsibilities. The wages of pilots reflect these features of the work, as well as the "industrial muscle" of pilot unions, and to some degree separate their industrial concerns from those of most other employee groups. Their conditions of work - for example, their isolation in the cockpit - are also unusual. These considerations do lend force to the case for pilot craft unions. There is a counter-case : joining pilots with other groups in the airline industry might reinforce the perceived interest of all groups in the success of the industry. This possibility lessens the case for specialised representation but does not greatly enhance the ASU's claim. The ASU is not an industry-based union. It is a conglomerate union, with a presence in several industries, and it covers only segments of the airlines industry. Joining pilots with "white-collar" employees within the Airlines Branch creates an entity which has no particular rationale. This comment must be qualified by reference to the proposed autonomy of pilot groups. The more absolute is that autonomy, however, the more pronounced is the reversion to de facto pilot unionism. The AFAP's entry into a federation of professional unions, with the prospect of a merge, arguably has more industrial logic than the absorption of pilots into the ASU. I acknowledge and take into account the ACTU's designation of the ASU as a principal union in the industry.

I find none of the alternatives confronting me satisfactory. The AFAP's conduct since the granting of award respondency can be criticised, but taken as a whole constitutes a reasonable response to post- dispute realities. Its conflict-of-interest problem is real, but diminishes with the passage of time. The employed pilots' rejection of the AFAP is, however, a reality which cannot be ignored, whatever my reservations about the merits of their attitudes. Continued recognition of the AFAP as the pilots' union entails a serious risk that the organisation with standing in the Commission will lack industrial credibility. The arrangement whereby the AFAP is the award respondent, but pilots are represented through an agency arrangement, is unattractive as a long-term remedy for that problem. I conclude, therefore, that a simple refusal of the applications with respect to pilots employed by Ansett, East- West and Ipec, leaving the AFAP "in possession", is not the appropriate outcome of the main case. I have misgivings, however, about committing pilots to the ASU. These arise, not from any fundamental criticism of the ASU but rather from the lack of any convincing reason to regard it as a union for pilots. It is an umbrella; the pilots may shelter under it and have access to its rights as an organisation; but it offers them little more¥ Moreover, as I have stated, I have doubts about the depth of the pilots' support for it.

It is against this background, and in the light of my decision in the reopened case, that I have come to see arguable merit in another possibility - expanding the coverage of AIPA to pilots in all four airlines and not merely to the group in Australian. This is not an option to be pursued without considering whether it is legally available and affording interested parties the opportunity to be heard on its merit.

On the 22nd December, Senior Deputy President Hancock issued a supplementary decision in relation to coverage of pilots employed by Ansett, East West, and Ipec :

"I do not propose to add to the substance of my decision of the 22nd September, wherein I found that neither the continued representation of pilot by the AFAP nor the accreditation of the ASU was a satisfactory outcome of the case. Accordingly, I now decide that orders will issue which deprive the AFAP of the right to represent the industrial interests of pilots but do not confer such a right upon the ASU. This course of action has the obvious disadvantage that pilots will, for a time, lack representation by an organisation. Should AIPA's application fail, that time will be extended. This problem is a manifestation of the disturbance of pilot industrial relations caused by the dispute of 1989-90. The employed pilots' rejection of the AFAP has left them imperfectly represented.

The orders will also give effect to my previously announced decision with respect to Qantas/Australian." 

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APPENDIX 9

 

THE 1989 AIRLINE DISPUTE - CHRONOLOGY

September, 1988

23rd September, 1988

23rd December, 1988

20th February, 1989

26-30th June, 1989

30th June, 1989

18th July, 1989

26th July, 1989

1 August - 9 August

7th August, 1989

9th August, 1989

10th August, 1989

15th August, 1989

17th August, 1989

18th August, 1989

19th August 1989

20th August, 1989

21st August, 1989

23rd August, 1989

24th August, 1989

30th August, 1989

6th September, 1989

11th September, 1989

12th September, 1989

13th September, 1989

14th September, 1989

17th September, 1989

21st September, 1989

22nd September, 1989

25th September, 1989

25-27 September, 1989

28th September, 1989

2nd October, 1989

4th October, 1989

4th October, 1989

6th October, 1989

10th October, 1989

12-18 October, 1989

17th October, 1989

18th October, 1989

19th October, 1989

21st October, 1989

23rd October, 1989

27th October, 1989

29th October, 1989

30th October, 1989

31st October, 1989

2nd November, 1989

6th November, 1989

9th November, 1989

10th November, 1989

13th November, 1989

14th November, 1989

15th November, 1989

16th November, 1989

17th November, 1989

19th November, 1989

20th November, 1989

21-22 November, 1989

22nd November, 1989

23rd November, 1989

25th November, 1989

26th November, 1989

28th November, 1989

29th November, 1989

30th November, 1989

2nd December, 1989

7th December, 1989

8th December, 1989

11th December, 1989

12-14th December, 1989

15th December, 1989

18th December, 1989

20th December, 1989

22nd December, 1989

31st December, 1989

4th January, 1990

5th January, 1990

8th January, 1990

10th January, 1990

12th January, 1990

15th January, 1990

16th January, 1990

17th January, 1990

18th January, 1990

19th January, 1990

23rd January, 1990

25th January, 1990

30th January, 1990

1st February, 1990

2nd February, 1990

3rd February, 1990

7th February, 1990

8th February, 1990

12th February, 1990

18th February, 1990

19th February, 1990

20th February, 1990

22nd February, 1990

27th February, 1990

28th February, 1990

1st March, 1990

4th March, 1990

6th March, 1990

7th March, 1990

8th March, 1990

9th March, 1990

11th March, 1990

13th March, 1990

14th March, 1990

19th March, 1990

21st March, 1990

23rd March, 1990

24th March, 1990

4th April, 1990

5th April, 1990

9th April, 1990

26/27th April, 1990

31st April, 1990

14th May, 1990

15th May, 1990

31st May, 1990

6th June 1991

20th December 1991

October 1992 Abeles resigns

10th November 1992

14th January 1994 Death of IRC President Barry Maddern

22nd September 1994 S118 Decision handed down

19th October 1994

26th January 1995

Mid Feburary 1996 Graeme McMahon sacked

15th June 1996 Coroner's Report into Monarch Airlines Crash released

31st July 1996

25th September 1996

26th September 1996

8th October 1996 Staunton Commission

25th May 1997

25th June 1999

9th May 2000

13th September 2001 Ansett Airlines Collapses

27th February 2002 Tesna abandons Ansett

4th March 2002

_____________________________

121. IRC Commissioner Maher attempted to get the IRC to carry out its charter of resolving the Dispute. In this capacity he organised a private meeting between AFAP President McCarthy and IRC President Barry Maddern. Maddern remained unmoved by this visit commenting that he "..always found Ian Oldmeadow to be truthful.."

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APPENDIX 10

 

A Short History of the Pilots' Federation by Captain Dick Holt

When Alex Paterson told me of his research and recording of the Pilots Dispute and asked me to provide some details of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots and its predecessor prior to 1978 (the year I retired as an airline pilot), I took the same view as Alex - a lead chapter for a book about the Pilots Dispute of 1989, covering the earlier history of their efforts in Australia to improve the profession, their place in it and overall their safety and that of their passengers, would be an appropriate contribution. I then thought some more, reviewed the history and analysis of the dispute as provided by Alex Paterson and saw beyond doubt that the reason such a dispute could occur laid itself bare in the earlier history of the Federation.

Why did the dispute occur? It occurred because Airline Managements had never really changed their original thinking that pilots were employees who should do what they were told, cease being prima donnas as to the value of their profession and their place in it, and stop setting a bad example to the industry at large.

In the period 1945 to 1989 (in my case to 1978), pilots, through their representatives, contested over very long periods the major elements of their employment which by its very nature controlled their daily lives and that of their families.

During this period there were long agonies of negotiation, threats and at times despair, but in the end a result was achieved of which virtually all pilots were justly proud. The situation now is that all of those agreed improvements have disappeared overnight and a couple of decades of further struggle lie ahead to set it all in place again. Looking back now that 30 years of effort on our part would not in retrospect trouble me except that I see all of our earlier concerns and fears proven by the action of employers in 1989-90. At long last they succeeded in placing their pilots where they had always believed and, given an opportunity, intended they should be. During that 30 years we were in retrospect deadly accurate in those concerns and I feel this written record from Alex Paterson now has an importance within the current experience proving everything we ever said in earlier days about the necessity for

Australia is yet to have its first major jet accident but when it does, you will see virtually all of these matters thoroughly ventilated as grieving relatives demand explanations and perhaps retribution for the loss of family.

It is ever thus - progress in aviation has always been through blood - kill people and you can get results - what a shocking specification; unhappily it is totally true - but now to the historical. The first joining together of pilot opinion and effort occurred in the five years following the end of World War 11 - that is from 1945 to 1950. The Australian Air Pilots Association was formed and a small but growing band of dedicated thinkers sought the support of their fellows to enable an executive group to speak with one voice. Their effort was assisted by the effect on pilots of some of the sub-standard conditions under which they lived and worked, created by:

and many other disadvantages.

The war had shown that the DCIII/Dakota could do virtually anything in what I will call the lower altitudes and pilots who had flown them and others who were finally converted agreed. Regulations however did not recognise that limitations in many areas of operation were badly needed.

As regular schedules on an all weather basis became the norm, and as the search for profit became part of the system of assessing aircraft, a whole new series of deficiencies became visible. In this climate airline management wished to expand and take full advantage of the post war scene. The aircraft were available (i. e. DCIIIs and the new 'giant' DCIVs) and there were plenty of pilots available.

Accordingly, routes were expanded, more pilots employed and the industry began a consistent growth, albeit without much regulation.

The proposition that schedules should be maintained to the maximum possible degree existed and was reasonable, and pilots along with other sections of the industry did their best, but by 1951/52 there were so many unacceptable elements that pilots began to look to banding together more firmly and speaking with one much louder voice.

This was attempted through the loosely organised Australian Air Pilots Association (AAPA), a body registered with the Arbitration Court and to some degree disregarded by the employers - ANA, TAA, ANSETT, QANTAS et al. Every matter of significance relative to employment had to be approached through the Court system of applications or demands by AAPA or employees. Eventually these were processed and ruled on by the Arbitration Court.

The Justices concerned had little or no knowledge or understanding of the airline industry from a professional point of view and were not really concerned to learn. Little or no progress was made and a hardening of pilot opinion and support for their Association slowly grew.

Well, there it was - no great progress achieved or in sight, a very determined set of employers whose expertise in the Arbitration Court gave them a considerable advantage and the AAPA obviously not so far fulfilling its charter.

A hardening took place and without even actually laying down an overall plan, a much more determined group of executives of the Association began to work to bring about change over time.

The writer became involved in 1954 and with the other elected Branch and Federation officers worked assiduously to improve the situation.

A few words about myself: Prior to joining the RAAF at the beginning of the war, my work experience was one year in a gold mine at Cracow Queensland and three years in the Lands and Survey Department of the Queensland Public Service.

My father as a miner was a member of the AWU and growing up I heard of many things wrong in the mining industry which the AWU was working to repair. Certainly I absorbed the Management versus Employees philosophy and understood trade unionism which as it happened I had read quite a lot about. However, 51/2 years in the Air Force dropped all of that well behind and virtually out of my consciousness.

When the war finished, I wanted nothing more than to be left alone to live life with my dear wife and our increasing family. It was not to be. I had by now developed a considered understanding of the problems we faced as a toothless Association. I hated the accommodation standards applied to pilots when away from home. I despised the amount of payment received for our very responsible work and I clearly saw that pilots had to take a huge interest in airline safety and also that they must work closely with all authorities and indeed with management to eliminate unacceptable risks and improve their everyday welfare.

So I became, I suppose, a militant and to a degree visibly so. I found others who had similar views and we began to work to further strengthen the capacity of the AAPA.

This was probably our worst period and almost totally frustrating in that it took so long to mount a case in the Arbitration system of the day which inevitably failed to achieve anything worthwhile, though at very considerable cost.

The AAPA had by then developed an organisation which could rapidly identify and assess a need and a means of satisfying that need, but a considerable built-in handicap was the reluctance of pilots to engage in any form of direct action because in the case of pilots refusing their services, airline operation stopped in its tracks, thereby badly affecting passengers and other airline staff.

In addition, management had gained the support of some Flight Management pilots who considered themselves above the level of those who in fact had to stop work and this group often quietly campaigned in support of Management opinion.

The obvious answer was for the AAPA to gather everyone's confidence by proceeding to build a reliable association of Pilot Executives; to employ reliable and industrially competent people to run Association affairs on a day by day basis and to become ever more competent in the patient negotiations with management representatives, which always ensued following any attempt to improve our situation.

If this was done, an occasional flash of temper, threat to take industrial action etc, would be used to speed up the process a little and pilots gave qualified support.

Nevertheless through the fifties (1951-1960) it was very hard going, and after several abortive attempts to go through the Arbitration Court procedures, a strong approach to all pilots by the AAPA Executives of the day - mid 1959 - gained approval for a completely different approach -

All of this was achieved in the second half of 1959.

The writer became the first elected President of the now Union/Association/Federation, call it as you will, and we began the long trek to wherever it was we would end up.

A reasoned but careful approach for recognition went to Airline Management groups and it began to be accepted that the now Federation really did represent pilots. We were careful to openly display our rules, our approach to membership fees high enough to ensure a working capacity, and our determination to seek industrial airline agreements from each airline, negotiated separately to ensure their old method of ganging up against us, could not occur.

By 1961 we had the first of these industrial agreements with each company and although the going was very tough, we noted a sneaking respect for our attitude and willingness to stick to those agreements. From here on, it was build, build, build to provide for -

The centre piece became an approach in 1964 to change the entire face of airline pilot working agreements in Australia by the introduction of many of the conditions we had noted pilots around the world enjoying, modified to the Australian scene.

We eventually interested Airline Management in looking into this approach and a long and careful study was made which gave both parties the incentive to proceed.

Final agreement was not reached until July 1966 and then only after prolonged negotiation - at times under acceptable installed Government Chairmanship - per the "Bland Procedures Agreement" and the "Tribunal" (Prof J Isaac). Agreement was eventually reached but only after a full scale threat of an indefinite stoppage had been voted for by the membership unless the now virtually agreed items were confirmed by Airline Managements.

But reached it was and from 12 July 1966 Australian Aviation conditions of employment for pilots changed their lives. Some rancour still existed at management level that pilots were now so well treated, but a form of respectful alliance had come to exist between officers of the Pilots Federation and the career Industrial Officers employed by the Airlines. One exception to the July 1966 Agreement was of course the Qantas pilot group and for them began a year of agony to achieve conditions of employment similar to their fellow members of the Federation flying the domestic airline routes.

Failure to progress in negotiations and management attitude stemming from the very top finally drove the Qantas pilots to a prolonged strike from early December 1966 which served to set a climate for further negotiations and in mid 1967 the Federation successfully concluded an employment agreement with Qantas acceptable to both pilots and management. The Pilots Federation had now achieved its major platform and would go on improving each segment of that platform of operating agreements to include general aviation and every aspect of flying in Australia.

Strong internal discipline within the Pilots Federation and its permanent staff meant we were able to adhere rigidly to our side of the new style of agreement. I retired in 1978 by which time I had been elected President of the Federation some seven times, the last time for the 1977-78 year and had seen all of my hopes and ambitions for the Australian Federation of Air Pilots achieved.

I had however made a fundamental error and that was to believe that we had eliminated and buried the deep management resentment of pilots which had been such a bane in earlier years. I believed that management had as a commercial decision arrived at the conclusion if you can't "beat 'em, join 'em", and with this philosophy found that living and working with us was not so bad. I echoed this in my valedictory address to pilots in September 1978, printed in the autumn edition of the Pilots Journal.

Salient to my view was the belief that we had given something to aviation in Australia. We had created a profession, our ethics were above reproach, our safety record from the introduction of jets to airline operation in the 1960s was second to none in the world, and so recognised. We had a respected place in the highest level in the world aviation scene though the International Federation of Airline Pilot Associations (IFALPA). We were a sophisticated part of Accident and Incident investigation and at every level of flight management and training we had a voice in our respective employer companies.

These things did not just happen - they flowed through arduous patient detailed work, determination, and very considerable sacrifice for no financial reward of any kind by a large band of elected pilot representatives at every level of the Federation over a long period of time. All these improved conditions, according to me, were set in stone and as I retired in 1978 I saw pilots having only to remain alert, not be complacent and their well organised professional way of life would continue.

Silly me, the dragon merely slept! Given his opportunity he would blast out of his bunker and 'fix' the pilots who obviously he and his kind had come to hate. He would prepare and organise and when the time came he would be completely ruthless and back those pilots would go to the supplicant status he and his management group believed pilots should have. Just as I never envisaged such an action by Management, neither did the officers of the Federation who succeeded my stewardship from 1978 onwards.

They had many new elements to cope with but none which threatened to change their way of life and so come 1989 they were suckers for the big blast and the charge which had been built up for the specific purpose.

These writings are then obviously not a criticism of the Federation's Executive members who were in office when the 1989 dispute began. It would not have mattered who they were, particularly in the initial stages. None would have had the prescience to know that the Prime Minister and the Government would hook in behind the Dragon of standover Airline Management to give it the temporary surge of strength necessary to overcome the pilot group.

None of them would ever have believed the Immigration laws would be fiddled to allow mercenaries into Australian skies.

None of them would ever have believed the entire Australian Union movement would stand aside and watch it happen.

If they could have looked ahead, none of them would have believed that the resultant events occurring as they did at every level of flying operations for the domestic airlines could happen without major jet accidents resulting from the loosening of standards in general flying safety following the introduction of mercenary pilots from overseas.

None of them would have believed that a year or so on they would be permanently outcast and a new group whom I need not, nor do I wish to recognise, would be flying Australia's domestic routes on contracts which debunked almost every pilot employed condition and privilege earned over some forty years of patient effort.

None of them would have believed as I certainly did not that there would need to be a decade or so of a repeat of history to bring the Australian pilot situation back to acceptable standards. I say a decade or two because the smell has to go away and small beginnings have to be built upon to again approach an acceptable position.

Some aspects of the current situation do help. How fortunate the Qantas pilots formed their own association when they did and thus remained outside the big gun barrage mounted by the dragon and his helper.

How fortunate that the blood lost by Australian Airlines over the dispute helped to force that Airline's amalgamation by sale to Qantas where over time the ugliness created domestically will be eaten away by the cautious approach the AIPA will make to this affair. Putting aside the destruction of the pilot ranks, I guess we can be pleased that the justice of events 'so shall ye reap' etc caught up with and destroyed the dragon and most of his associates. Their dream of domination of the airline industry is in other hands and they are mostly gone - just as are almost all of the pilots they so grievously damaged.

What remains to be said - two things I believe.

I wish to see the anatomy of the dispute fully revealed.

I wish to see the public marking of those responsible for turning an individual matter into a way of destruction not only of the airlines themselves but of a very large segment of the Tourist Industry and allied services.

I see this as possibly being done through blood - just as most progress in aviation in this and other countries has been achieved.

Enough of us should remember the situation which came to exist in 1989 to the degree that should however unfortunately a jet aircraft accident occur to an Australian aircraft, the subsequent furore, grief and determination be used to call up specific terms of reference to an inquiry to evidence the real reason for the deterioration in airline safety in Australia which will almost surely be the reason for such an accident to happen.

Remember Mount Erebus - it is possible to go back and find the real reasons an aircraft accident happens even where those reasons stem from attitudes alone.

I have the deep hope there will be no such accident but if it occurs, pilots should be loud and long in their cry for a full Royal Commission with a long term of reference which says:

and so on.

The other point I would like to make is that a reader should not make the assumption that the early and tough years of creating the Pilots Federation and its subsequent success were the work of any one man or even of many. The excellent result was the work of a long list of dedicated pilots who sank their own differences to elect and direct executive staff to create and execute policies, ably helped by permanent staff officers who were highly skilled professionals in the field of industrial relations.

My contribution to this book about the pilot efforts in earlier years is limited to non- specifics to enable a balanced view to show, but the reason for its writing is the massive disaster and destruction of Australian pilots' way of life which occurred from 1989 onwards.

I would not like it to be forgotten that a large number of dedicated Executive Officers at all levels, professional and general staff, built a magnificent edifice. Its destruction was an act of violence conceived and executed by Management, its bedfellows and minions. It was not the fault of previous or then current Executive Officers and staff.

Those with whom I worked, far too numerous to mention here, by the similarity of their thinking and the loyalty they engendered, carefully led the Association and Federation to achieve greater things.

In conclusion I repeat that I was asked by Alex Patterson to provide a picture of the Federation and its activities in the industrial area up to 1978 when I retired and without going into too much detail I have tried to do just that, adding perhaps a few thoughts of my own. I wish the current Executive officers and professional staff every success along the road ahead. It is a hard one but I do observe the flickering of the lamp of progress.

Don't let it go out.

R. T. HOLT

19 May 1994 

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APPENDIX 11

 

AIRLINE INCIDENTS SINCE AUGUST 1989

INCOMPLETE

The following list of Australian airline incidents since August 1989 is by necessity incomplete due in part to the failure of sections of the CAA to carry out their charter of properly monitoring the operations of the airlines during and after the Dispute. 122

_____________________________

122. See chapter on 'The Role of the CAA' for clarification of this assertion.

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RELATED WEBPAGES

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Alex Paterson is an ex Ansett pilot who resigned his position along with most of his colleagues in August 1989 associated with the Australian Pilots' Dispute of that year.

At the time of the Dispute he was a newly elected member of the AFAP executive and although he had little influence over the major decisions pertaining to the same he played a significant role in the day to day running of the Dispute as it unfolded. This role provided him with a rare inside view of the Dispute from a pilot's perspective.

The author can be contacted at email: 

 

Photograph of Alex Paterson 

COPYRIGHT

The document 'A Pilot's Perspective of the Australian Pilots' Dispute of 1989, Appendices' is the copyright © of the author, Alex Paterson. All rights reserved by the author. Not withstanding this, the document may be reproduced and disseminated without the express permission of the author so long as reference to the author is made, no alterations are made to the document and no money is charged for it.

Additional Keywords: army, airforce, industrial dispute, pickets, strike

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